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The Price of Paid Prioritization
The International and Domestic Consequences of the
Failure to Protect Net Neutrality in the United States
Arturo J. Carrillo and Dawn C. Nunziato
On 10 November 2014, President Obama reaffirmed his Arturo J. Carrillo
commitment to a free and open Internet and called on the is Clinical Professor of Law
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “imple- and Director of the International Human Rights Clinic
ment the strongest possible rules to protect net neutrality.”1 at The George Washington
In particular, the president recommended that the FCC University Law School. Proreclassify broadband providers as telecommunications ser- fessor Carrillo co-directs GW
vices subject to common carriage obligations. The president Law School’s Global Internet
was responding to the No Commercially Unreasonable Prac- Freedom and Human Rights
and sits on the Board
tices section of the May 2014 Proposed Rules for Promoting Project,
of the Global Network Initiaand Protecting an Open Internet, which would have autho- tive as an alternate academic
rized broadband providers to accord differentiated treat- representative. He formerly
ment to Internet traffic, thereby undermining net neutrality served as the acting director
of the Human Rights Clinic at
and common carriage principles in the United States.
As written, the Proposed Rules of May 2014 would have Columbia Law School. Professor Carrillo also worked
violated international trade and human rights obligations as a legal advisor on human
of the United States. This is because, as a member of the rights for the United Nations
World Trade Organization (WTO) and a party to the Inter- in El Salvador.
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the United States is bound to respect principles of nondis- Dawn C. Nunziato
crimination and free expression when regulating essential is a Professor of Law at The
communications media like the Internet. Any FCC rule that George Washington UniverLaw School, where she
does not meaningfully protect net neutrality at all levels of sity
co-directs the Global Internet
interconnectivity would run afoul of these legal obligations Freedom and Human Rights
and expose the United States to legal action by other govern- Project. She is an internationally recognized expert in
ments and individuals prejudiced by its actions.
On March 12, 2015, the FCC adopted a new set of rules the area of free speech and the
to promote and protect an open Internet.2 In its 2015 Open Internet and has taught Internet law courses and has been
Internet Order, the FCC reclassified broadband providers an invited presenter on Interas common carriers subject to nondiscrimination obliga- net free speech issues around
tions and enshrined strong net neutrality protections. The the world at prominent uni2015 Order, contrary to its predecessors, largely meets the versities and institutions.
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requirements of the international trade
and human rights treaties to which the
United States is a party. Even so, gaps
in the new Rules mean that the United
States may still be liable under international law for potential failures to
ensure that net neutrality and non-discrimination principles are adequately
protected.
In this Article, we first examine the
trade and human rights obligations
of the United States as they relate to
net neutrality to determine the extent
to which each of the two most recent
approaches adopted by the FCC to promote an open Internet would comply
with those obligations. We also examine
the history of regulation of broadband
providers as common carriers subject to
nondiscrimination obligations under
U.S. law. We conclude that the FCC
has, by and large, successfully complied with its international trade and
human rights obligations in its new
Open Internet Order.

nondiscriminatory terms.4 A failure by
the FCC to meaningfully protect net
neutrality would violate the terms of the
BATS.5
The BATS integrates clear non-discrimination principles into its primary
obligations. It covers packet-switched
services, including broadband services, which the United States “expressly
included [in the Agreement] to protect
its growing IP-based services providers.”6 The BATS commitments for IPbased services include several key principles that converge with net neutrality,
including transparency, anti-competitive practices, and, most importantly, fair interconnection.7 Under the
BATS, fair interconnection “will be
ensured at any technically feasible point
in the network” and is to be provided
“under nondiscriminatory terms”; “in
a timely fashion”; and at “cost-oriented
rates that are transparent, reasonable,
[economically feasible], and sufficiently
unbundled so that the supplier need
not pay for network components or
International Trade Conse- facilities that it does not require for the
quences of FCC Failure to service to be provided.”8
Adopt Strong Net Neutrality
What this means is that, if the FCC
Rules. The United States is bound had retained the May 2014 Proposed
by the WTO’s General Agreement on Rules, or adopted similar rules allowTrade in Services (GATS), and has ing broadband providers to accord
additionally signed on to the Basic differentiated treatment to Internet
Agreement on Trade in Telecommuni- traffic, it would have contravened the
cations Services (BATS), committing to United States’ legal obligations under
regulating its telecommunications ser- the GATS and the BATS to ensure
vices on the basis of several principles fair interconnection for foreign service
that are essential to net neutrality.3 suppliers. Such standards would have
In particular, the BATS enshrines the allowed broadband providers to engage
United States’ commitment to ensure in individual negotiations for paid prithat “interconnection” in telecommu- oritization with edge providers to crenications services, including Internet ate “fast” and “slow” lanes for Internet
service, be provided to the service sup- service,9 which by definition would viopliers of other WTO Member States on late the requirement in the BATS that
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interconnection be provided on nondiscriminatory terms.10 Adopting such
a rule would thus have left the United
States open to the risk of a WTO complaint by other WTO member States
on behalf of their disadvantaged service
suppliers.11
Similarly, the United States would
have been at odds with key trade partners in Latin America and Europe. Net

another continent that is, by and large,
embracing strong net neutrality protections. In April 2014, the European
Parliament passed the European Commission’s proposed telecoms reforms
that will enable a Digital Single Market,14 including guarantees safeguarding
net neutrality and strict rules for the
blocking and slowing of Internet services.15 The Netherlands, Slovenia, the

[If the FCC] adopted rules allowing broadband providers to accord differentiated treatment to Internet
traffic, it would have contravened the United
States’ legal obligations under the GATS and
the BATS to ensure fair interconnection for foreign
service suppliers.
neutrality is of particular importance
in Latin America, where approximately
85 percent of the region by population
and trade lives under a legal regime
that strongly protects this principle.
Over the last five years Paraguay, Chile,
Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Argentina, and Brazil have all adopted
legislation or regulation guaranteeing
net neutrality. More to the point, at
least 90 percent of all Latin American
Internet traffic passes through Miami
and would therefore be subject in some
form to U.S. regulation.12 If the FCC
had not guaranteed strong protection
for net neutrality, as do most of the
countries in Latin America, the negative impact on trade in the region would
have been severe.13
Rules like those proposed by the
FCC in May 2014 have had the potential to hinder trade with Europe as well,

United Kingdom, and Norway, among
others, have enshrined meaningful net
neutrality protections through legislation or regulation,16 and France and
Germany are currently considering
similar legislation.17
As it turned out, the FCC chose to
follow President Obama’s exhortations
and adopt in its 2015 Open Internet Order a framework for regulating
the Internet in the United States that
is strongly protective of net neutrality in several respects. First, the FCC
defined the scope of its new Rules as
applying to “both fixed and mobile
broadband Internet access service.”18
Second, the FCC enacted three brightline rules that go to the heart of net
neutrality protections: no blocking;19
no throttling;20 and no paid prioritization.21 Finally, the FCC devised a way to
reach other types of conduct that may
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not come under the bright-line rules
by establishing its “no unreasonable
interference/disadvantage standard.”22
Under this rule, ISPs cannot unreasonably interfere with or disadvantage
either end users’ ability to use and
access broadband service or Internet
content or edge providers’ ability to
make such content available to end
users.23
So is the United States now in
full compliance with the above-cited
provisions of the GATS and BATS?
Not quite, due to two gaps in coverage
created by the 2015 Order. First, the
FCC determined that it would not
apply a bright line rule to flatly prohibit
sponsored data or “zero rating” plans
but would instead evaluate these on
a case-by-case basis under the “no
unreasonable interference/disadvantage
standard.”24 Zero rating usually refers
to the practice of Internet companies
paying certain telecommunications to
offer “free” access for their mobile
network customers to the sponsoring
companies’ online services, which is
realized by exempting traffic to the
companies’ sites from a subscriber’s
data caps or allowing customers without
a data plan access to those sites.25 Since
zero rating is a deviation from net
neutrality — as sponsored data is given

Global Governance

for the reasons noted above. Second,
the FCC similarly ruled that none
of the bright-line rules or standards
relating to broadband Internet access
service would apply to “Internet traffic
exchange arrangements,” also known as
“interconnection.”26 Interconnection
refers to the interface of networks
with other networks in the exchange
of Internet traffic.27 The FCC decided
that, “for the time being”, extending
robust net neutrality protections to
such exchange arrangements “was not
warranted.”28 Instead, interconnection
disputes will be reviewed on a case-bycase basis for practices that might be
construed as unreasonable or unjust29
— a broad and vague standard.30 As
a result, the door remains open for
discriminatory agreements such as those
involving paid prioritization to occur
within interconnection arrangements,
for example, between ISPs and backbone
content delivery networks (CDNs).31
Any dissonance in net neutrality rules
between the United States and major
trading partners in Latin America and
Europe could set the stage for possible
disputes down the road. Under WTO
rules, “[a] dispute arises when one
country adopts a trade policy measure
or takes some action that one or more
fellow-WTO members considers to be

Any dissonance in net neutrality rules be-

tween the United States and major trading partners in
Latin America and Europe could set the stage for possible disputes down the road.
priority over non-sponsored data – the
FCC’s eventual approval of any zero
rating plans could prove problematic

breaking the WTO agreements, or to
be a failure to live up to obligations.”32
Indeed, the United States has engaged the
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WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
on behalf of its own interconnection
interests. In 2000, the United States
made several claims against Mexico
for violations of Mexico’s Schedule
of Commitments, which includes the
BATS Reference Paper.33 In 2004, a
WTO panel concluded that Mexico
had violated its GATS commitments by
failing “to ensure interconnection at
cost-oriented rates,” failing to “prevent
anti-competitive practices by firms
that are major telecoms suppliers,”
and failing “to ensure reasonable and
non-discriminatory access to and use
of telecommunications networks.”34 In
response to the WTO panel’s findings,
Mexico has now complied with the
panel report to the satisfaction of both
the WTO DSB and the United States.35
In sum, several factors under the
GATS and the BATS weighed against
the May 2014 Proposed Rules and in
favor of enforcing strong net neutrality
rules in compliance with U.S. obligations, which the United States largely,
but not entirely, succeeded in doing
through the adoption of the 2015 Open
Internet Order. The United States has
not been shy in utilizing the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body to further
its own telecommunications interests.
Accordingly, the United States could
hardly claim surprise if and when other
member States follow suit to contest
the new FCC rules because the 2015
Order seems to authorize zero rating plans under certain circumstances,
while expressly excluding interconnection from the scope of its net neutrality protections. These gaps in the 2015
Order’s net neutrality protections may
eventually lead to inconsistencies with
WTO nondiscrimination obligations

due to foreign IP-based services and
required by the aforementioned trade
agreements.36

International Human Rights
Consequences if the FCC Failed
to Adopt Strong Net Neutrality Rules. If the FCC had enacted the
May 2014 Proposed Rules, or others
like them, that action would have also
violated the United States’ international human rights obligations to promote
and protect freedom of expression in a
non-discriminatory manner. Allowing
broadband providers to accord differentiated or discriminatory treatment to
Internet traffic would have impermissibly impinged on the rights of all persons to equally seek, receive, and impart
information, ideas, and opinions in
the media of their choice.37 As noted in
the prior section, the FCC avoided this
pitfall by adopting several bright-line
rules in its 2015 Open Internet Order
to protect net neutrality in broadband
access service. It failed, however, to
extend these protections to interconnection arrangements, leaving the door
open to potential abuse. It likewise
failed to ban zero rating, a per se exception to net neutrality. Thus, the United
States is arguably still vulnerable in the
human rights arena as well.
The United States is bound to respect
and protect freedom of expression in
a non-discriminatory manner, inter
alia, under the United Nations’ ICCPR
and the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man (ADHR or
American Declaration).38 Both the
ICCPR and ADHR enshrine freedom
of expression and non-discrimination
as fundamental rights that States must
promote and protect.39 Freedom of
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expression is the right to seek, receive,
and impart information, ideas, and
opinions “through any media and
regardless of frontiers.”40 It is well settled that this right is protected equally
online as it is offline.41 Accordingly,
“the treatment of Internet data and
traffic [cannot be] based on the device,
content, author, origin and/or destination of the content, service or application.”42 States “should take all necessary
steps to foster the independence of [the
Internet] and to ensure access of individuals thereto.”43
Paid prioritization and other
discriminatory arrangements may
act as impermissible restrictions on
freedom of expression by making access
to certain kinds of content or networks

Global Governance

Although a State may under certain
circumstances place some restrictions
on freedom of expression, it may do
so only if it meets certain criteria.
Any proposed restrictions must (a) be
“provided by law”;45 (b) for a legitimate
aim such as national security, public
order, or public health and morals;46
and (c) must be proportional, necessary,
and “directly related to the specific
need on which they are predicated.”47
Increasing corporate profits by
providing a competitive advantage to
well-resourced service providers or
networks is not a legitimate rationale
recognized by international law for
(relatively) restricting users’ freedom
of expression. This suggests that both
sponsored data plans as well as paid

…paid prioritization at the interconnection
level may run afoul of the ICCPR’s and the American
Declaration’s freedom of expression and non-discrimination rules.
more or less difficult depending on
whether an individual or company
has economic leverage to access those
preferential arrangements. Only the
wealthiest companies and organizations
are generally able to afford to pay for
prioritization or preferential treatment
to make their information and content
more readily accessible to users.44
The ability to access information —
another important component of
freedom of expression — may also be
curtailed for those persons or entities
that cannot or choose not to pay the
premiums associated with prioritization
or enhanced access to networks or
information.

prioritization at the interconnection
level may run afoul of the ICCPR’s and
the American Declaration’s freedom
of expression and non-discrimination
rules.
Any failure to fulfill its human rights
obligations under international law
could expose the United States to
denunciations by affected individuals, NGOs, and perhaps other governments, as in the trade arena. On
the one hand, grievances can be aired
at hearings before the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights, the
body that monitors compliance by OAS
member States with regional human
rights agreements like the American
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Declaration. On the other, advocates
can denounce U.S. failures to protect freedom of expression at hearings before the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, the UN authority
that monitors State compliance with
the ICCPR. As a State Party to that
treaty, the United States is subject to a
periodic review of its compliance with
that treaty by the Human Rights Committee, an independent body composed
of 18 international experts.48 Both the
Inter-American Commission and the
UN Human Rights Committee publish
their final determinations of States’
compliance with the respective treaty
obligations monitored.

which to censor. Since the beginning of
the modern communications era in the
1930s, the FCC has imposed obligations on providers of interstate communications services (like telephone
and telegraph companies) to facilitate
the transmission of all legal content.
The United States Postal Service has
also been regulated as a common carrier that is required to facilitate the
transmission of all legal content and is
prohibited from discriminating against
such content. 49 As Ithiel de Sola Pool
explains:
[T]he law of common carriage
protects ordinary citizens in
their right to communicate. The
rules against discrimination are
The FCC’s Regulation of
designed to ensure access to the
Broadband Providers as Commeans of communication…. [T]
mon Carriers Subject to Nonhis element of civil liberty is cendiscrimination Obligations
tral to the law of [common carUnder U.S. Law. The FCC’s
riage].50
March 2015 Rules mark an important
The common carriage status of comstep toward correcting the mistake the munications providers benefits memFCC made in 2002 when it declined to bers of the public by granting them
classify broadband providers as “tele- access to communications conduits
communications services” subject to under a nondiscrimination principle.
common carriage obligations under the As Jerome Barron observed, individuTelecommunications Act of 1996. In als who rely on common carriers to
reclassifying broadband providers as facilitate their communications “bencommon carriers, the FCC harmo- efit from the democratic egalitarianism
nizes the treatment of Internet forums that characterizes the nondiscriminafor expression with the United States’ tory access principle associated with
historic treatment of other forums for common carrier law.”51
communication under the long-recogCongress overhauled the regulation
nized common carriage doctrine.
of telecommunications providers in
The common carriage doctrine the Communications Act of 1934,52
imposes obligations on privately-owned which charged the newly-created FCC
speech and mass communication con- with regulatory authority over telecomduits to facilitate the expression of oth- munications providers (telegraph and
ers and prohibits these conduits from telephone companies), regardless of
exercising the discretion to determine whether they enjoyed monopoly power,
which communications to facilitate and and imposed common carriage reg-
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ulations on such providers.53 Under
the 1934 Act, common carriers were
charged with the obligation to serve
as nondiscriminatory conduits for all
(legal) content originated by others.54
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, common carriage and nondiscrimination obligations were applied
to traditional conduits of communication like telephone companies. In the
early 1970s, the FCC began to consider
whether and to what extent to impose
common carriage obligations on computer-assisted processes and services. In
a series of “Computer Inquiries,” the
FCC essentially created two categories
of computer-assisted communications
services — basic services and enhanced
services. “Basic” (later, “telecommunications”) services, like telephone
and facsimile services, were those that
offered straightforward transmission
services, and those offering such services were regulated as common carriers
and made subject to nondiscrimination
requirements.55 “Enhanced” (later,
“information services”) were those in
which computer processing applications were implemented to act on a
subscriber’s information, and providers of such services were exempt from
common carriage and nondiscrimination requirements.
In its passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress revisited
the categorization of services subject
to common carriage regulation that
was established under the Computer
Inquiries. Under the 1996 Act, “telecommunications” services were made
subject to common carriage regulation
(replacing the category of “basic services”), while “information services” were
exempted from common carriage regu-
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lation (replacing the formerly exempt
category of “enhanced services”).56 The
Act defined a “telecommunication service” as “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public…regardless of the facilities used.”57
The Act maintained significant common carrier obligations on providers of
“telecommunications services,” while
leaving “information services” providers subject to far less regulation. While
the Act creates a presumption that telecommunications carriers will be treated
as common carriers, it authorized the
FCC to forbear from enforcing any
provision of the Act if the FCC determines that such enforcement is unnecessary to guard against discrimination,
to ensure just and reasonable services,
to safeguard consumers, or to serve the
public interest.58 Title II of the Communications Act sets forth a complex
regulatory regime imposed upon common carriers, but the essential duty
imposed upon common carriers is the
duty not to discriminate in the offering
of their services, and in particular, not
to discriminate against certain types of
content in serving as conduits for the
transmission of such content.
In its 2002 “Inquiry Concerning
High-Speed Access to the Internet over
Cable and Other Facilities”59 (hereinafter “Declaratory Ruling”), the FCC
mistakenly concluded that cable modem
service was an “information service”
with “no separate offering of ‘telecommunications service,’”60 the latter of
which would have rendered such services subject to common carriage obligations. The Commission ruled that the
provision of cable broadband service
did not contain a separate telecommunications service because the transmisInternational Engagement on Cyber V [ 10 5]
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sion of the data is “part and parcel” of
that service and is integral to its capabilities.61 As an “information service”
with “no separate offering of telecommunications service,” cable operators’
provision of broadband Internet access
was exempted from the common carrier
regulations of Title II of the Communications Act.62
This flawed ruling was significant in
that it reversed course on the history of
the Commission’s regulation of telecommunications services. Throughout
the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC formulated and implemented a workable
distinction between the underlying
common carrier network, on the one
hand, and the services and information made available over that network,
on the other. The 2002 Declaratory
Ruling collapsed this crucial distinction
and for the first time permitted communications conduits to discriminate
against the content they were charged
with transmitting over their networks.
The FCC’s fundamental misstep
in removing common carriage and
nondiscrimination obligations from
broadband providers (later approved by

v. Brand X Internet Services et al.) was
its determination that cable operators
providing broadband Internet access
were not — in whole or in part —
offering “telecommunications services”
and were therefore not subject to
regulation as common carriers.63 The
FCC erred in refusing to recognize
that broadband providers primarily
offer “telecommunications services”
to the public and serve as conduits
for the transmission of the public’s
information even if they also offer
some additional “information services.”
Because it failed to recognize the
telecommunications service function
offered by broadband providers, the
FCC erroneously removed common
carriage and nondiscrimination
obligations from broadband providers
and reversed nearly a century’s worth
of history embodying “democratic
egalitarianism that characterizes the
nondiscriminatory access principle
associated with common carrier law.”64
In regulating broadband providers,
Congress and the FCC should be
guided by the principle underlying
modern communications law that

Congress and the FCC should be guided by the
principle underlying modern communications law
that liberal democracies require a wellinformed citizenry, which in turn requires that
citizens enjoy the freedom to communicate and to
access communications conduits on a nondiscriminatory basis.
the Supreme Court in National Cable & liberal democracies require a wellTelecommunications Association et al. informed citizenry, which in turn
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requires that citizens enjoy the
freedom to communicate and to
access communications conduits on
a nondiscriminatory basis. The same
principles that justify regulating
telephone and telegraph operators
and the postal service as common
carriers subject to nondiscrimination
requirements - in order to “protect
ordinary citizens in their right to
communicate” - are equally valid when
applied to broadband providers and
Internet communications.65
The May 2014 Proposed Rules,
which would have allowed broadband
providers to discriminate against whatever content or applications they choose
for whatever reasons they choose, were
inconsistent with the historical democratic egalitarian principle of according
individuals protection in their freedom to communicate. Fortunately, the
March 2015 Rules correct this mistake
and require broadband providers to
assume, at minimum, the nondiscrimination obligations that historically have
been imposed upon common carriers
— the duty to facilitate and transmit in a
nondiscriminatory manner any and all
legal content.

Global Governance

ment to Internet traffic.66 We trust that,
as part of its analysis and justification,
the FCC considered the international
consequences of its actions, along with
the domestic ones, to enact rules that
prohibit the differential treatment of
Internet traffic based on the economic
status of the content creator or the enduser.
The FCC correctly achieved this goal
and avoided much, but not all, exposure to international challenge before
the WTO and international human
rights bodies by reclassifying broadband
providers as common carriers subject to
nondiscrimination obligations under
U.S. law. The dual issues of zero rating and interconnection as potential
threats to strong net neutrality remain
largely unaddressed in the 2015 Order,
leaving the door open to possible future
disputes. Nevertheless, what is certain
is that by adopting the new Rules, the
FCC took a substantial step towards
ensuring meaningful compliance with
the United States’ international trade
and human rights obligations with
respect to nondiscrimination and freedom of expression.
The authors would like to thank GW Law School

Conclusion. In March 2015 the FCC International Human Rights Clinic students Sarah
adopted strong net neutrality rules
prohibiting broadband service providers from according differentiated treat-

Bessell, Ana González, Carrie James, and Jannat
Majeed for their research and writing support.

International Engagement on Cyber V [ 10 7 ]

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2951751

THE PRICE OF PAID PRIORITIZATION

NOTES

1 White House, “Net Neutrality: President
Obama’s Plan for a Free and Open Internet,” Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality (date
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